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ABSTRACT: This article introduces financial warfare as a valuable
and innovative tool for deterring the sponsors of the “little green”
and “little blue men” of proxy warfare. By analyzing the economic
terrain, financial trace, nodes, and edges of a sponsor’s financial
networks, US policymakers can develop, plan, and deliver financial
deterrence necessary to support international stability as well as to
persuade or coerce an adversary by increasing the costs of their wars.

I

n an era of proxy conflicts—such as Russia in Crimea and Ukraine,
China in the South China Sea, and Iranian proxies in Iraq and the
Levant—financial power may offer the United States the greatest
capability to counter our adversaries’ “little green” and “little blue men.”1
Financial power is simply the means to make warfare—or anything for
that matter—more or less costly. Extracting a cost from our adversaries by
collapsing a single transaction, a single enterprise, or their entire defense
industrial base provides the United States with a potentially unmatchable
deterrent capability useful in conventional and unrestricted warfare.2
Without innovating our strategic capabilities, America may have no
option other than sending its fleets into the cauldron of the South China
Sea in response to China seizing and militarizing islands hundreds of
miles from its shores, intimidating the region using the little blue men
of its maritime militia, restricting freedom of navigation, enforcing the
self-declared air defense identification zone, and rejecting international
law.3 Without innovating our tactical capabilities, North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) tanks and troops may have to respond
conventionally to an expansionist Russian state emboldened by the success

1      For more on the development of the term little green men in reference to unconventional
troops, see Vladimir Zinin, Igra v soldatikov: pochemu reputatsiya armii okazalas’ pod ugrozoy [Playing
soldiers: Why the army’s reputation is threatened], Gazeta.ru, July 22, 2015, http://www.gazeta.ru
/comments/2015/07/22_e_7652977.shtml; and Alexander Anichkin (2014). Zelenyye chelovechki
[Little green men] Tetradki [Notebooks] (blog), March 13, 2014, http://european-book-review.
blogspot.com/2014/03/little-green-men.html. Little blue men similarly refers to irregular maritime militias, see Simon Tisdall, “Little Blue Men: The Maritime Militias Pushing China’s Claims,”
Guardian, May 16, 2016.
2      For more on the importance of the supply chain that forms the defense industrial base, see M.
Thomas Davis, “Blog: The Incredible Shrinking Defense Industrial Base,” Signal, June 16, 2105. For
more on “unrestricted” reflecting the multifaceted approach to modern power projection, see Qiao
Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts, 1999).
3      Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Irregular Forces at Sea: ‘Not Merely
Fishermen’—Shedding Light on China’s Maritime Militia,” Center for International Maritime
Security, November 2, 2015; Alex Linder, “China Swiftly Rejects Hague Tribunal Ruling against
Its South China Sea Claims,” Shanghiist, July 12, 2016, shanghaiist.com/2016/07/12/china_rejects
_hague_ruling.php; and “Arbitration Award More Shameless than Worst Prediction,” Global Times,
July 12, 2016, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/993855.shtml.
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of its special forces and irregular troops seizing Crimea, segmenting the
Ukraine, and exporting irregular war to Latvia, Estonia, or Lithuania.4
Even though America fought successfully against Iranian proxies,
such as Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi militia in the battle of Najaf
in 2004 and Qais al-Khazali’s Special Groups in Iraq thereafter,
conventional constraints failed to limit Iran’s expansion in the Levant
and its influence over Iraq.5 The South China Sea, Ukraine, Crimea,
Iraq, and the Levant illustrate how state-sponsored unrestricted conflict
has become the core of adversarial power projection. Adversaries’
asymmetric capabilities are outpacing US strategy, and America faces a
conundrum—escalate to conventional war or give ground to new threats.
When the United States projects power, it operates through four
principal avenues: military, diplomatic, information, and economic.
Financial power, or the capacity to leverage capital or money, has
typically been considered a subset of economics. Given the capabilities
and effects of computer networks, particularly the internet, finance is
separating from economics to become an affiliated but distinct channel
suitable for power projection.
For the purposes of this paper, the delineation between finance
and economics uses Yale Professor Paul Bracken’s definition: “The
economic system deals with the hard and soft outputs of the economy—
that is, goods and services. The financial system deals with money and
credit.”6 Economics is simply the production and distribution of goods
and services using three factors or inputs: capital, resources, and labor7
Finance, what Bracken colloquially refers to as money and credit, is also
the “system that includes the circulation of money, the granting of credit,
the making of investments, and the provision of banking facilities.”8
Financial power can be used to derive economic effects. Financial
warfare can, at a minimum, disrupt the monetary foundations
underlying production and distribution and, accordingly, disrupt an
adversary’s ability to produce and distribute goods and services. Such
an attack would not only preclude an adversary’s ability to transact (to
price and exchange goods and services) but also to move, to aggregate,
or to store capital necessary for production and distribution; in short,
production and distribution would cease and the adversary’s economy
would collapse.
From another perspective, economic warfare tools such as blockades
and embargoes target the distribution of goods and services—outputs.
Since financial warfare targets capital, it collapses an input. Thus,
economic actions like sanctions, blockades, or embargoes sever
connections between the United States and its target; while financial
4      John R. Haines, “How, Why, and When Russia Will Deploy Little Green Men—and Why the
US Cannot,” Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) E-Notes, March 9, 2016, http://www.fpri.org
/article/2016/03/how-why-and-when-russia-will-deploy-little-green-men-and-why-the-us-cannot/.
5      Kimberly Kagan, The Surge: A Military History (New York: Encounter Books, 2010), 2.
6      Paul Bracken, “Financial Warfare,” FPRI E-Notes, September 13, 2007, http://www.fpri.org
/article/2007/09/financial-warfare/.
7      Factors of production are a neoclassical foundation of economics found in Adam Smith, The
Essential Adam Smith, ed. Robert L. Heilbroner (New York: W. W. Norton, 1986), 151; more fully
developed in David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (London: John
Murry, 1821), 24.
8      Merriam Webster, online, September 26, 2016, s.v. “finance.”
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power projection bolsters capabilities by maximizing connectivity
to targets. Economic actions are unit step functions—for example, a
blockade is a definitive, declaratory step, and an incomplete or partial
embargo is not an embargo. As such, blockades and embargoes
are poor tools for a proportionate response. Conversely, the finely
graduated tools of financial power projection, which can target a single
transaction or an entire industrial base equally well, offer a number of
compelling advantages in comparison to the imprecise consequences of
economic power.
Financial power works in physical and electronic dimensions,
and though existing financial markets (open market operations).9 An
advantage of financial power projection is that its indirect or derivative
approach to economic production and distribution presents less
surface area for adversaries to exercise intelligence collection on, or
to react against. Because it offers an indirect, misattributable or even
unattributable approach, finance has significant potential for actively
managing the risk of responding to any adversary.

Responding to Contemporary Conflicts

The wars confronting America today incorporate a range of different
combat modes including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and
formations, and terrorist acts that include indiscriminate violence and
coercion as well as criminal disorder. Such wars allow the sponsor to
operate between the traditional means of state power projection by using
nominally nonstate entities to conceal themselves from conventional
retaliation. Since conventional military formations pursuing total war
could easily destroy these irregular formations, the use of nontraditional
means preserves the sponsor’s ability to project power in operations
short of conventional war, fueling and supporting strategic deterrence.
Further explained, such “deterrence is the manipulation of an
adversary’s estimation of the cost/benefit calculation of taking a given
action”; thus, “by reducing prospective benefits or increasing prospective
costs (or both), one can convince the adversary to avoid taking the
action.”10 The strategic deterrence aspects of such tactics facilitate
Russia’s maintenance of its enclaves in the Ukraine, China’s fortified
islands in its near seas, and ongoing Iranian hegemony in the Levant.

Mechanics of Deterrence

Russian, Chinese, and Iranian deterrence strategies are conducted
through military, diplomatic, and economic coercion of their neighbors,
the United States, and other adversaries. This form of deterrence requires
9      Electronic means include analog approaches that might disrupt the reliability of power generation, transmission, or usage. Cyber or digital means, a subset of electronic which includes analog,
range from data manipulation in ledger systems to targeting core systems and interfaces as well as
the reach and consistency of rule schemas inside liquidity markets (stocks, bonds, commodities, etc.).
Cyber operates at microsecond speeds, which may exceed an adversary’s ability to measure and to
assess its effects. This speed introduces uncertainty and indeterminacy that may suppress or delay
counteraction. The speed also enables the creation of waves and wave-centric methodologies that
use sequenced, discrete vectors at various frequencies. This capability can create powerful waves of
price, supply, and duration volatility that travel across markets, geographies, and time. Such waves can
exploit discrete vector strikes as well as adversarial and allied actions and reactions on an aggregate
or cumulative basis.
10      Austin Long, Deterrence from Cold War to Long War: Lessons from Six Decades of RAND Research
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 7.
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constructing a known status quo, a mutually understood level of conflict,
or nonconflict, within which participants manage risks and expectations.
For example, because the Russians, Chinese, and Iranians cannot
compete independently with the current militaries of the United States
and its allies, they will pursue actions short of direct military engagement.
Consequently, the Russian, Chinese, and Iranian perspectives and
decision calculi rely on the absence of direct conventional military-tomilitary engagement. If the United States or any protagonist is unwilling
to challenge the status quo ante by supplemental or innovative actions,
then, by definition, they capitulate to the antagonists’ actions.
In order to manage multiple conflicts of this type while simultaneously
invalidating their deterrent strategies, the United States must develop new
ways to project power, and challenge, change or annul the adversaries’
decision calculus. Financial power disrupts calculability because it
operates outside the Russian, Chinese, and Iranian formulations of
deterrence, introducing new and unique variables. Socialist or sectarian
political economies subordinate the independence of individual actions
to centrally administrated ideology or oligarchy. The subordination of
individual financial actions is enforced by constraining capital liquidity,
storage or transport to the needs of the State. Ultimately, China, Russia
and Iran are at a direct disadvantage to capitalist economies because
they are, by definition, less capital efficient. Financial power exploits
this disadvantage.

The Object of Financial Warfare

Analogous to military art, combat in financial warfare is conducted
through the engagement. The object of the engagement in financial
warfare is the adversary’s capital.11 The engagement is the only means
of destroying the adversary’s capital, and it may come in the form of a
direct attack on primary capital or an indirect attack on secondary and
tertiary capital components. Primary capital is internal and inseparable
from the enterprise; it is an input to, and a factor of, production. Capital
includes cash, liquid investments and the value of raw materials, worksin-process, and finished goods inventories. If primary capital is removed,
the enterprise collapses.
Secondary capital components are debt and equity, which are sold
by the enterprise in exchange for cash, i.e. primary capital. Both debt
and equity, secondary capital components, facilitate the formation of
primary capital, provide a channel to it, and exercise a claim upon it.
Secondary capital differs from primary capital in two respects: it does not
organically possess capital functions, and it is external to the enterprise.
Tertiary capital components were created to provide the functions
of capital to secondary capital components. Examples of tertiary capital
components include depositories, markets: stock; bond; foreign currency;
and commodity markets, and systems infrastructure: credit and debit
cards; ATMs; point of sales; and real time gross settlement systems.
11      Carl von Clausewitz made an off-handed comparison between war and finance: “The decision by arms is for all major and minor operations in war what cash payment is in commerce.” While
Clausewitz may have used the concept as a background metaphor, the similarities were apparent to
him. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1976), 97.
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In financial war, engagements are fought in physical and electronic
dimensions. Physical or digital capital can be attacked by engagements
in those dimensions. In addition to physical and electronic engagements,
tertiary capital components can be reduced through degrading their
ability to provide capital liquidity—storage or transport.
Financial warfare can reach deep into the interior of a country, a
hostile territory, or a denied area to project national power through
supply and logistics chains. Industrial economies producing complex
products, for example automobiles, use a sequence of specialized
manufacturers, a supply chain, with each manufacturer purchasing
raw materials (inputs) for their production, maintaining in-process
inventory, and outputting finished goods. These outputs become inputs
for downstream manufacturers in the supply chain. The transactions
between or among specialized manufacturers in a supply chain are
generally explicit and priced.
An adversary’s defense industrial base—entirely, by industry, by
geography, or through an individual transaction of a single enterprise—
can be attacked through capital-value transiting supply and logistics
chains. Capital value of raw materials, work-in-process or finished goods
inventories can be attacked by injecting or engineering volatility into
their price, transit duration, or supply. Whipsawing price—creating
sequential stock-outs and gluts that starve and then flood a market—at
one component of the supply chain will cascade to other downstream
companies. If any part of a supply chain is reachable, then all parts of
the supply chain can be affected. In other words, risk to the entire supply
chain is affected by variance in the risk to any single link.
The ability of finance to reach within and among enterprises in
a supply chain is only one vector into a target economy. Engineering
contagions or cascade failures based upon bank lending, credit expansion,
direct investment, and currency exchange are obvious additional vectors.
Contemporary gray-zone warfare is designed to present a level of
conflict that appears unreachable by conventional means. By using
financial vectors exogenous to the conflict state, the United States can
introduce an entirely new category of risk, financial risk, into the conflict
causing a change in valuation between risk and reward. This condition can
increase enterprise and supply-chain risk, raising expenses and eroding
the commercial capabilities of the sponsor’s supporting infrastructure,
defense industrial base, or a vital national interest. Financial risks can
be increased to burden a conflict’s sponsor with greater expenses.
Timing financial engagements to an adversary’s actions reinforces the
immediacy of costs to the sponsor.
Financial strikes can manipulate spot and structural volatility
to induce liquidity crises and bankruptcies for a locality, region, or
province as well as a political leader, party, or regime. While the results
of financial power can be used to coerce and change the decision
calculus of policymakers, financial power can also persuade a sponsor’s
commercial competitors to expand and to challenge them for market
share. Sequential, multivector financial engagements can be used to
engineer contagions, cascade failures, or Black Swans while remaining
almost undetectable. Such financial campaigns can shape the adversary’s
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economy towards fragility by incentivizing over centralization and
socialization of risk as well as promoting asymmetry, agency, and opacity.

Terrain Maps and Traces

The first step in financial power projection is targeting, which
requires the national authority, department, agency, or combatant
command to develop a detailed economic terrain map and financial
trace of the target to construct accurate, precise, and specific financial
vectors. An economic terrain map is a networked view of a targets’
productive, distributive and systemic activities over a physical and
virtual geography identifying integration points among the target,
its vendors, its customers, and the relevant economies, which are all
potential disintermediation targets.
A basic accounting of the factors of production—resources, capital,
and labor—reveals how the target produces and distributes goods and
services. Other characteristics—such as the costs, returns, and margins
from component business processes; the mix of sales, income, and
profit from consumer, industrial, reseller, and government markets; and
the explicit and the reimbursed products or services delivered to the
government—also help quantify potential leverage points by detailing
the breadth of the target’s business.
In addition to identifying productive activities, the economic terrain
map should provide a comprehensive and detailed picture of the target’s
distributive activities including the logistics channels that move goods
from production to consumers and critical factors of time, place, and
possession that separate goods from consumers—for example, what
factors might inhibit the delivery of seafood in Chinese maritime militia
trawlers to purchasers?
Once the target’s economic terrain is mapped, a financial trace of
that economic space is made. This trace identifies and details the financial
providers, networks, mechanisms, operations, and infrastructure that
enable the target’s capital liquidity, storage, and transport activities at
the primary component level. Tracing the secondary and tertiary assetliability network for both current assets such as working capital, credit
lines, bank accounts, raw material, and work-in-progress inventories,
as well as long-term assets such as owners’ equity and infrastructure
illuminates who is at risk.
From this financial trace, the appropriate network nodes—
individuals, vendors, suppliers, commercial industries, and government
entities, as well as the connecting edges that include transaction and
payment networks can be identified. Namely, the nodes clarify where
liability, risk, and reward reside, and the edges show how those elements
flow across the network. The financial trace prioritizes vulnerable nodes
and edges by their capacity to bear or transmit risk or loss.
In the case of a targeted enterprise and its customer conducting a
sales transaction in physical cash, for example, the targeted enterprise
will probably deposit its revenues into a depository (a bank) at some
point. If the buyer uses another notional form of capital such as a
credit or debit card instead of cash, then both parties to the transaction
must have systems and depositories to provide liquidity, transport, and
storage for their capital. The transaction, its supporting systems and
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depositories are all available targets. Thus, traces are subject to multiple
means and methods of attack whose results may range from isolating
the target from its financial service providers; collapsing its ability to
transact, move, or store capital; or bankrupting it.

Targeting

Financial power projection, in many ways like artillery or missiles,
ranges from unguided to precision-guided vectors against an adversary
efficiently and effectively delivering payloads adapted for point, area, or
system targets. Point targets involve a specific transaction, a store or a
transport of capital, or an individual enterprise. Area targets pinpoint
grouped or associated transactions, stores or transports of capital, or
associated enterprises such as a supply chain. System targets encompass
liquidity markets (such as stock, bond, or commodity markets), industries,
geographies, or an adversary’s entire economy. In summary, targeting
financial power can be graduated from capital in specific productive
or distributive activities inside a single company to sovereign systemic
targets that include money supply and circulation velocity.
In overview, the financial targeting process begins with the desired
outcome: specific outcomes require specific inputs while generalized
outcomes may have arrays of complementary inputs. Each outcome
sought must be described in terms of the effects or characteristics
desired, which include:
•• Scale—Is the outcome to encumber a single transaction of a single
company or stop all financial activity within an adversary’s economy?
•• Speed—When is the outcome required in relation to the theoretical or
practical delivery speeds of the available tools?
•• Duration of effects—Should the outcome’s duration be instantaneous
or occur over decades or more?
•• Intensity of effects—Within the scale and duration of an outcome,
how intense are the desired effects—should the efficiency of an
activity be reduced or be collapsed entirely?
•• Overtness of means—How profound is the risk to the initiator, their
sources, or methods—overt, covert, or clandestine?
Combining the desired outcome with the mapped terrain and trace,
the determinations of critical requirements and vulnerabilities can be
made. The means employed—physical, electronic, or open market—
must be determined. Metrics, channels, and vectors must be detailed.
Cost must be determined. If a networked target is involved, consideration
must be given to constructive and destructive interference to preclude
unintended consequences. If approaching the target through cyber
methods, amplitude and frequency of volatility wave functions must be
examined. Lastly, financial power projection can be formulated to occur
independently, in coordination with, or in support of other activities.
To illustrate, the desired outcome might be to collapse the supply
chain of a Chinese maritime militia company of “little blue men” to
preclude its provocative actions against US naval forces conducting
freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. Scale, speed,
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duration, intensity, and overtness should factor in the timing, scope, and
scale of the US exercises and the probable Chinese response.
A critical miscalculation of many contemporary deterrent strategies
is the assumption that the sponsor’s receipt of economic benefits will
remain unchanged even though they segment or destroy the commercial
commons from which those benefits arise. China’s operative assumption
in the South China Sea, for example, assumes it can deconstruct or
segment the global maritime commons militarily through anti-access/
area denial tactics while continuing to receive the commercial benefits,
i.e. seaborne exports and maritime commerce, of a global commons.
Economic and financial systems are, by definition, networked.
Removing the South China Sea from the global maritime commons
renders the commons less than global in scale. Regardless of China’s
locality advantage and the volume and range of its missile and aircraft
coverage, commercial craft seeking to leave or to enter the South China
Sea are eventually outside China’s physical power-projection capabilities
and their transit is dependent upon US acquiescence.
Similarly, Russia’s seizure of Crimea and part of eastern Ukraine
through proxy forces of “little green men” segments the network of
sovereign and legitimate territorial control in Eastern Europe; however,
Russia’s economic assumption appears to be one of uninterrupted trade.
Likewise, Iran’s expectation is that the use of its proxy forces in the
Levant and Yemen will have little impact on their hydrocarbons export
and Persian Gulf maritime commerce.
The economic commons in these cases, the South China Sea, Eastern
Europe, and the Persian Gulf are being segmented or removed from
the global economic commons. This expulsion increases the risks and
expenses as well as distance and duration for trade. Financial warfare is
designed, at a minimum, to capture and deliver these increased costs to
the conflict’s sponsors.

Conclusion

Financial power may enable the United States to develop and to
present the contemporary sponsors of aggression with the costs of their
actions at net present value, which will reduce prospective benefits and
increase prospective costs both directly to the sponsor and inversely
to their competitors. America should meet the Russian, Chinese, and
Iranian challenges by developing and presenting financially enabled
forward contracts, i.e. deterrent strategies, to its adversaries. Moreover,
the United States should match an aggressor’s activities with concurrent
deterrent responses of similar magnitude, and duration.
Financial warfare is an appropriate means: it has the breadth and
depth to project power in a fashion suitable to achieve national policy
goals. As an innovation, not just of means and methods but of efficacy
and efficiency, financial warfare creates and uses a new channel for
power projection to support national aims. Because finance can directly
or indirectly touch every aspect of economic activity, financial warfare
can accordingly range across the entire spectrum of economic responses
to an adversary’s actions accurately, precisely, and proportionately.
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Financial warfare can endow the United States with an unmatched
deterrent capability useful in conventional as well as other wars.
Creating a financial warfare capability initially requires the data and the
analytics necessary to build economic terrain maps and financial traces.
Then, the United States must create internal and external government
competencies to exercise physical, electronic, and open-market means
against primary, secondary, and tertiary capital components of selected
targets, independently and within campaigns.
Financial warfare offers a number of compelling advantages.
America’s use of financial warfare will gain strength over time by
maximizing connectivity to, and penetration of, targets and by
providing precise, proportionate responses. Lastly, financial warfare
can help America counter, if not preempt, an adversary’s nontraditional
warfare capabilities.

